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<url><loc>https://safetyinsights.org/2026/08/06/the-unspoken-theory-how-socio-technical-systems-are-used-without-being-theorized-in-safety-research/</loc><news:news><news:publication><news:name>SafetyInsights.org</news:name><news:language>en-gb</news:language></news:publication><news:publication_date>2026-08-05T21:12:04+00:00</news:publication_date><news:title>The unspoken theory: How ‘socio-technical systems’ are used without being theorized in safety research</news:title><news:keywords>complexity, sociotechnical system, sociotechnical, system</news:keywords></news:news><image:image><image:loc>https://safetyinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/sts1.png?w=150</image:loc></image:image></url><url><loc>https://safetyinsights.org/2026/08/05/warning-signs-rarely-arrive-pre-packaged-to-be-warnings-managers-must-have-an-idea-of-what-exactly-it-might-be-a-warning-of-otherwise-it-is-merely-more-information/</loc><news:news><news:publication><news:name>SafetyInsights.org</news:name><news:language>en-gb</news:language></news:publication><news:publication_date>2026-08-05T03:17:31+00:00</news:publication_date><news:title>“Warning signs rarely arrive pre-packaged&#8221; &#8211; to be warnings &#8220;managers must have an idea of what exactly it might be a warning of—otherwise, it is merely more information”</news:title></news:news><image:image><image:loc>https://safetyinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/warnings.png?w=150</image:loc></image:image></url><url><loc>https://safetyinsights.org/2026/08/05/rethinking-learning-from-incidents-in-healthcare-a-safety-ii-model-integrating-work-as-imagined-work-as-done-and-work-as-experienced/</loc><news:news><news:publication><news:name>SafetyInsights.org</news:name><news:language>en-gb</news:language></news:publication><news:publication_date>2026-08-04T21:04:58+00:00</news:publication_date><news:title>Rethinking learning from incidents in healthcare: a Safety-II model integrating work-as-imagined, work-as-done, and work-as-experienced</news:title><news:keywords>resilience engineering, hop, healthcare, human and organizational performance, safety differently, investigation, patient safety, safety 2, root cause analysis, safety ii</news:keywords></news:news><image:image><image:loc>https://safetyinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/rethink.png?w=111</image:loc></image:image></url><url><loc>https://safetyinsights.org/2026/08/04/critical-controls-barriers-part-2-is-close-enough-good-enough/</loc><news:news><news:publication><news:name>SafetyInsights.org</news:name><news:language>en-gb</news:language></news:publication><news:publication_date>2026-08-04T00:54:33+00:00</news:publication_date><news:title>Critical Controls &#038; Barriers Part 2: Is close enough good enough?</news:title></news:news><image:image><image:loc>https://safetyinsights.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/barrier-part-2-thumb.png?w=150</image:loc></image:image></url></urlset>
