Abstract
This study focuses on the (development of) safety culture of a big gas distribution company. Using a social constructionist framework, we explore the discourses constructed by three of the organization’s subgroups in relation to safety. Those groups, which are all situated at field level from a single working site, and therefore share a similar proximity to safety issues, occupy different hierarchical and functional positions.
We assumed that each group may be considered as a specific social world, within which a specific perception of, and relationship with, safety is constructed, and that discourse analysis offers access to this construction. Individual semi-structured interviews were carried out to gather the discourses and analyzed in an ethno-methodological and conversation analysis perspective.
Our discourse analysis allowed us to confirm our assumption by identifying that from one shared ‘root’ perception, three different constructions of safety stem. They appear to depend on both the group’s specific jobs, and group positioning within the organization. Building on Berger and Luckmann’s development cycle and on Weick’s theory of sensemaking, we interpret those results as ensuing from a hiatus in the organization’s rules enactment process and culture development cycle.
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From the full-text paper:
- Results found three distinct employee groups (field workers, frontline supervisors and network supervisors).
- The three groups perceive the organisation’s safety policy as “ambiguous … as it has reached a point where it no longer makes sense in actual situations, where it does not provide clear guidance as to how to ensure safety in real work situations”. Field workers most often face ambiguous situations which “results from the fact that any work situation at one point includes unforeseen elements, hence becoming uncertain. They consider themselves not being in a position to manage such situations for lack of information, missing either elements of context … or clear rules that they could apply” (pg.24).
- “Ambiguity is not as present in the discourse of frontline supervisors. To them the inadequacy of the organization’s safety policy is mostly a matter of distance and misunderstanding. As a consequence they regret such ambiguity, but explain it almost as if it were an honest mistake; the result of an inevitable situation inherent to a large and somewhat disorganized organization, rather than an intended attempt to maintain grey areas” (pg. 24).
- As indicated in the image below, differences in how rules, risks, safety processes and professional identity were found between field workers, frontline supervisors and network supervisors.
- For instance field workers saw rules as “ill-adapted to field realities”, and safety processes as propaganda or insincere. In contrast network supervisors had the least ambiguity on how to manage safety issues and the least propensity for trade-offs, having what the authors called the most “rigid discourse on safety”
- The constructions of safety seem to stem from the “distance” each group is from direct harm. Gasmen who are most directly interfaced with harm construct safety as something to be protected against, that is, their own individual, physical safety. Frontline supervisors aren’t directly exposed to harm and hold a hierarchical position between field and management responsibility, reflecting ambiguity. Network supervisors have the least ambiguous discourse, being a function of their management role and being technical experts.
- “each group entertains a specific relationship to rules and procedures, which depends on both its position within the organization and its proximity to ‘real’ work. Field workers fit rules to situations and therefore play the ‘acting’ part of the process. Frontline supervisors interpret and relay the rules, which may be considered as a translation and general compliance function which helps build the company’s compliance framework. As to network supervisors, they adapt rules to their specific aims, namely ensuring (short-term) safety of the workers and the environment and network resilience and therefore build a situational, or field-rooted compliance framework”
- Relating to each group’s definition of professionalism: “Each construction seems to reflect the group’s own power over the situation: gasmen hold the ultimate, ‘real-life’ power, but are formally denied the discretion to use it; frontline supervisors hold hierarchical power, but have no real means to enforce it, other than constant availability in case something unexpected arises and a good relationship with the team of gasmen, who may behave in a more or less collaborative manner. As to network supervisors, the combination of technical expertise … and hierarchical authority leads them constructing the most empowered discourse over safety management” (p23)
The gap between corporate rules and policy and what is done in practice reflects a lack of shared perceptions of daily practices. The authors comment “As a consequence, institutionalized safety rules and policy are perceived as not reflecting field concerns…[and] are therefore received with suspicion or even outright rejection and are not internalized by the group as ‘the way to do things around here.’” (pg. 25).
Authors: Blazsin, H., & Guldenmund, F., 2015, Safety Science
Study link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.06.001
Link to the LinkedIn article: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/social-construction-safety-comparing-three-realities-ben-hutchinson
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