This was really interesting. It explored the history and context of workplace safety campaigns increasingly attributed to worker carelessness and worker issues.
(Note: this is a dense case study and I can only scratch the surface. I’ve had to skip most descriptions/explanations. Second, it’s not a criticism of the people involved in the safety campaigns, but rather, nicely, tried to explain why it made sense to take that position.)
It’s said that “blaming the worker” seems to be part of a broader government strategy “(which includes under-reporting injury levels and masking ineffective state enforcement with public condemnation of injurious work) to contain the potential political consequences associated with unsafe workplaces” (p135).
The safety campaign in question was the 2008 “bloody lucky” campaign which was aimed at young workers and contained quite gruesome videos and posters.
The two main questions of the study were:
1. How does the campaign explain why workplace injuries occur?
2. Why does it take this explanation?
First, they provide a detailed overview of the topic.
The careless worker myth in OHS is said to be a narrative that “that seeks to explain occupational injury by asserting that some workers or groups of workers are accident prone, careless or even reckless” (p136). It’s based on a narrative of “freedom of choice”, where people have complete and unrestricted choice over their jobs and thus their level of occupational risk exposure. They also choose, via their behaviour, to have accidents. This narrative, however, ignores the issues of workplace design and contextual factors which influence safety.
They cover the lack of robust evidence supporting the careless worker myth. Data in one study attributed over half of injuries and deaths attributable to unsafe working conditions. Of data that associates serious injuries with unsafe acts, it’s remarked that many can be triggered by unsafe conditions; thus obscuring the relationship.
The stigmatisation of workers, as workers compensation seeking, fits a similar societal narrative like “welfare mom” or unemployed as insurance cheats, which seek to blame people for their circumstances while minimising the contribution of outside factors.
Interesting, the authors argue that these negative perceptions of workers “frame the employer as the victim, thus completing a reversal of blame” (p137).
One narrative used to frame safety is some behavioural approaches in use. The authors argue that some of these behavioural approaches “define the workplace as a venue of measurable behavior which can be properly shaped to prevent injuries from incompetence, inattentiveness and worker carelessness” (p138). And while there is a multitude of studies supporting improvements via these methods, concerns are raised about the potential of suppressing worker reporting of accidents and overlooking factors within the control of the employer. Another report highlighted the disparity of some behavioural approaches where it’s used for greater control over workers “while providing ‘‘no mechanism for the workers to discipline management’’ for inadequate safety protection” (p138).
Results of the campaign analysis
Overall, it’s remarked that the campaign videos “clearly explain workplace injuries as caused by worker carelessness” and the tips for accident prevention “compound this attribution by placing responsibility on workers for matters that are outside of their control” (p144). The campaign is said to stigmatise workers as careless and “misleads viewers about both what causes injuries and how to prevent them” (p144).
Looking at the history of safety campaigns in Alberta, it’s said that a 1979 campaign focused on worker behaviour like with a poster that said “Ken won’t be seeing you again”. The messaging said to be about workers causing injuries and only changing behaviour will remedy it.
From `85 – `92, centrefold posters were ran in the quarterly OH&S magazine focusing on:
1. Encouraging good behaviour
2. Making safe choices
3. Reporting and acting on hazards etc.
The authors provide examples of how each foci can shift the focus from the employer providing a safe workplace on to employees spotting hazards and speaking up.
They provide a couple more examples of campaigns over the period up to 2008’s Bloody Lucky campaign. The latter was pitched at 15-19 year olds.
The authors reviewed 6 videos produced as part of the campaign and other materials like posters and the like. The videos focused on things like
1. An employee in heels climbing a rickety ladder in a shoe store to reach stock. Intended message being not to climb a rickety ladder up high in heels – whereas the authors highlight this takes the focus away from the employer *not* providing a safe system of work to reach stock up high.
2. A deli worker distracted by a beautiful woman while slicing meat. Intended message was for workers to pay attention whereas the authors argue about whether the machinery has appropriate guarding and safety features and whether the employee is appropriately trained and competent and has supervision.
3. A restaurant worker is slicing food and badly cuts his finger after being harassed by coworkers to hurry up. Intended message was to use correct knife handling skills, but the authors ask why wasn’t the focus on the toxic (my words) work environment that is harassing and rushing the worker?
4. More examples like this.
They argue across these 6 videos and posters that the focus is placed away from employers and on to workers who have little control over these workplace factors.
The website which accompanied the campaign apparently had questions that young workers can ask their employers about workplace safety. Quoting the paper:
“This approach assumes asking the employer to provide more information will protect the new worker against workplace hazards. It does not encourage the worker to question the safety of the workplace design, process or expectations. The questions, coupled with the message of the videos, imply that the extent of employer obligations is to provide information to workers. “ (p142).
In interviewing some of the people involved in the campaign’s development (e.g. the project manager for instance), the intention was for the videos to grab the attention of young people and get them asking questions about workplace safety. When the authors asked the project manager about the perceived careless worker theme embedded in the video, it was said the government sought to avoid blaming workers for accidents and although the videos did focus on worker behaviour, the campaign aimed to get workers to speak up about safety.
In not making the same mistake in blaming the campaign developers or government we can see that a challenge for the government is in one instance it must facilitate the capital accumulation process and ensure that overregulation doesn’t impact the profitability of industry but on the other hand it must protect workers. One compromise seems to be focusing on worker training, supervision and discipline – seen to be “an approach that shifts responsibility for workplace injuries from employers to workers” (p139).
The authors then spend some time explaining the tension government faces in balancing this issue. However, it’s argued that a campaign such as this presents to young workers an “incomplete (and we believe inaccurate) explanation of what causes workplace injuries” (p144).
Further, a practical takeaway of this analysis is that campaigns like this that focus on worker behaviour ignores “the contribution of environmental factors to injuries [and] may ‘‘blind’’ new workers to such hazards” (p144).
Finally, it’s said that ignoring environmental/contextual factors and overemphasising behavioural factors may “delegitimize resistance to workplace hazards, thereby potentially reducing the willingness of workers to seek hazard mitigation” (p144).
Authors: Bob Barnetson & Jason Foster (2012), International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health
Study link: https://doi.org/10.1179/1077352512Z.00000000020
Link to the LinkedIn article: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bloody-lucky-careless-worker-myth-alberta-canada-ben-hutchinson
SafetyInsights.org 