This looked at the relationships between operational practices and safety practices and outcomes – and the impact of Joint Management System (JMS) practices rather than safety or operations (OPS) managed separately. 10 facilities from 9 companies were included.
Based on analysis, facilities were divided into two dominant “cultures” based on their characteristics:
1) a supportive culture for safe operations (SAFE-OPS) found to take a longer-term planning focus with safety and OPS (4 total);
2) operational culture focused on production (PROD-OPS), not safety focused and relatively undisciplined with only short-term planning (6 total).
Note: You could probably substitute “culture” with “logics” if you prefer.
Results
Facilities with more SAFE-OPS characteristics were found to utilise JMS, whereas PROD-OPS were found to utilise less formal management systems and managed safety and OPS separately.
In 3 of the 4 facilities with a JMS, it was found that the joint system was created from the safety system rather than a OPS system. An exception was one facility (a Smelter) that had a seemingly best-practice OHS system but a culture that prioritised OPS over everything else – and with less effective safety performance.
Data showed that the top performing facilities on OPS outcomes were also the top performers on safety performance & all used a JMS and had supportive cultures for safety and planning. Conversely, the 6 facilities with lower performance on both outcomes had the OPS-focus & no JMS.
For facilities with more reactive, short-term OPS goals (PROD-OPS), it was found that they:
1) generally didn’t go beyond meeting basic regulatory standards
2) manage safety and OPS separately
3) had little formal methods for learning & continuous improvement
4) Where formal systems existed, they tended not to be used.
For trade-offs, when the PROD-OPS cultures traded safety for production they also tended to have “more average” OPS outcomes.
It was found that any safety/OP trade-off was a short-term gain and a type of false economy: when OPS was prioritised largely over safety then defects & costs increased, & safety was reduced; “poor safety management was part and parcel of poor management in general” (p129).
Indeed, in this sample, OPS and safety excellence couldn’t be separated and that these facilities managed “both well or both poorly” (p130); further noting that their findings “blur or even eliminate the boundaries between managing safety and managing the operations” (p131).
Further, the authors state “When safety is examined in the wider organizational context, organizations that appear to be trading safety for business gains are generally losing on both” (p130).
Whereas both groups faced the same external pressures, the SAFE-OPS was better able to focus on long-term planning and improvements in joint OPS and safety, compared to the reactive PROD-OPS focus. In the SAFE-OPS facilities, safety priorities were better owned by OPS/OPS Managers rather than safety people.
This makes sense since often the OPS and safety management practices are directed at the same people (OPS), who are best placed to manage priorities with the appropriate support. (Although I think this relationship is more complex & we can also argue that safety people should be better able & with more responsibilities to understand and jointly improve OPS priorities).
Authors: Authors: Veltri, A., Pagell, M., Johnston, D., Tompa, E., Robson, L., Amick III, B. C., … & Macdonald, S. (2013). Safety science, 55, 119-134.
Study link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2012.12.008
Link to the LinkedIn article: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/understanding-safety-context-business-operations-study-ben-hutchinson
SafetyInsights.org 