How deregulation can become overregulation: An empirical study into the growth of internal bureaucracy when governments take a step back

This 2020 paper from Størkersen, Dekker and colleagues explores the growth of internally driven overregulation when “governments take a step back”.

It’s open access (links in comments), so I’m not summarising it.

They document how the “rules, clutter and red tape that often not contribute to safety”, a type of overregulation, is “generated largely internal to the organization, not only imposed by governments (at least not in anywhere near that level of detail”.

Key factors observed why internal overregulation grows:

  • Overregulation because practical work is demanding to verify
  • Overregulation because of liability management and managerial insecurity
  • Overregulation because of auditor expectations and “Making work auditable”
  • Managerial insecurity and liability

It’s worth a read.

Ref: Størkersen, K., Thorvaldsen, T., Kongsvik, T., & Dekker, S. (2020). Safety Science, 128, 104772.

Study link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2020.104772

LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/benhutchinson2_this-2020-paper-from-st%C3%B8rkersen-dekker-and-activity-7133197578912874497-lQ0G?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

One thought on “How deregulation can become overregulation: An empirical study into the growth of internal bureaucracy when governments take a step back

Leave a comment