“We miss a great deal when we substitute culture for power”
I love this quote from Perrow in Normal Accidents (emphasis added).
Perrow briefly discusses the role of power in organising risky technology.
Discussing Vaughan’s interpretation of the Challenger disaster:
· “I also find the role of power and interests minimized in Diane Vaughn’s otherwise excellent account of the Challenger accident”
· Vaughn’s immensely detailed account of the accident is probably the best book we have on a single accident”
· However, I disagree with her interpretation … I see this as an example of a damaged organization that allowed unique production pressures to override safety concerns, but that is not her interpretation”
· “she builds what would be called a “social construction of reality” case that allowed the banality of bureaucracy to create a habit of normalizing deviations from safe procedures” where people “did what they were supposed to do, and were used to doing, and the deviations finally caught up with them”
· Perrow thinks “that interpretation minimizes the corruption of the safety culture, and more particularly drains this case of the extraordinary display of power that overcame the objections of the engineers who opposed the launch”
· “Those who left the organization described that night quite differently. They made it clear, as did much other evidence she presents, that this was not the normalization of deviance or the banality of bureaucratic procedures and hierarchy or the product of an engineering “culture”; it was the exercise of organizational power”
I prefer Vaughan’s account, but can’t also discount the role of power in major accidents.
Speaking of which, I have a mini-compendium on power in safety & organisations coming up in a couple of weeks.
Ref: Perrow, C. (2011). Normal accidents: Living with high risk technologies-Updated edition. Princeton university press.
SafetyInsights.org 