Injury measures “not much help in assessing the risks of a catastrophic event” and the follies of rear-view mirror driving via injury measures

On the folly of relying on injury measures to prioritise proactive goals.

First image is an apt extract from the Pike River commission – noting that:

“personal injury rates and time lost through accidents … gave the board some insight but was not much help in assessing the risks of a catastrophic event”.

Moreover, the board “appears to have received no information proving the effectiveness of crucial systems such as gas monitoring and ventilation”.

Image 2 is an extract from a 2008 mining prosecution highlighting the folly of relying on injury measures to set proactive priority areas.

It notes that while an audit before and following the fatal 2000 incident had been undertaken on training, no other audits had been undertaken.

Notably, “the mine had been running for over twelve months injury free with no lost time and **there was no reason for the Board to flag any specific area that needed attention ** over and above that being directed by the managers at the mine” (emphasis added).

Highlighting the false safety of injury measures, “In terms of its safety performance, the mine was operating better than any other mine in the country and so there was no reason for the Board to bring in third party auditors”.

Despite this, some notable gaps existed in their safe systems of work.

Although the prosecution in image 2 wasn’t successful (prosecutor didn’t establish breaches of the then OHS Act 1983), this rear-view mirror driving via injury measures is pretty consistent with Pike River, and major disaster audit failures indicated in my published audit paper.

Refs:

Image 1: Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy

Image 2: Rodney Dale Morrison v John Hamilton Milner and Rodney Dale Morrison v Stephen Barry Baldwin. Prosecutions under s 15(1) of the OH&S 1983 by virtue of s 50 of the OH&S Act 1983 [2008] NSWIRComm 77