This paper explores how complex systems not only fail, but succeed, and provides 9 ways that we can move beyond simplistic notions of system failure due to ‘human error’. Ref: Woods, D. D., & Cook, R. I. (2002). Nine steps to move forward from error. Cognition, technology & work, 4(2), 137-144. Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/4JaTtoAhb6s7xphKNt9ll9?si=yf9Xac6KSciKBmSZkwI_2Q Shout me a coffee… Continue reading Safe As E64: How can we move forward from notions of ‘human error’?

Uh oh, spaghettio! This study found that believing people are the primary cause of accidents is a barrier to effective learning. I guess blaming people isn’t a solid approach for learning and improvement… They also point out the cycle of shallow investigations focusing on immediate ’causes’ and error, “rather than the context where the incidents… Continue reading Blaming people not a robust method for learning and improvement in construction

What factors facilitate or obstruct learning from incidents in construction? This systematic literature review evaluated 30 papers from 12 countries. * Parts 2 & 3 in comments * Extracts: ·      Overall, they identified four core learning topics: 1) learning input, 2) learning process, 3) learning participant, 4) learning context – see image 2 for context ·   “learning… Continue reading Influencing Factors on Learning from Incidents in Construction Project-Based Organizations: A Systematic Literature Review Approach

“Trust in information from the project manager, safety manager, UK HSE and workmates was based on the source’s accuracy, while trust in information from supervisors was based on their demonstrations of care” This examined employee trust in risk information from a sample of construction workers. 131 UK construction workers from the same company were surveyed.… Continue reading Improving occupational safety: using a trusted information source to communicate about risk

‘Safety Culture’ is treated by some as the holy grail of organisational safety concepts: valourised and promoted uncritically. But should we, or even can we, analyse ‘safety culture’ in investigations? Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/episode/2tx0IK3stj1djNDbwzQs4U?si=lV9PnfvVR62ynW0k7ePNNg Shout me a coffee (one-off or monthly recurring)

Safe As is expanding onto YouTube in 2026. Same thrifty content, but now with…100% more pixels? Currently testing camera and lighting with an ultra-low budget, while avoiding the look of a dank, gulag basement. Videos will be the base format and uploaded to YT, then audio for Spotify. So, we’ll see how it goes.  Shout… Continue reading Safe As heading for the `tube in 2026

What is a leading indicator? There’s lots of definitions – I’ve covered dozens on my site. But this is one I’ve liked from Kjellen for a good while, where: “a leading safety performance indicator as an indicator that changes before the actual risk level of the organization has changed” Reiman & Pietikäinen discuss the implications… Continue reading Leading indicators as indicators that “changes before the actual risk level of the organization has changed”

How was blame distributed across different actors after the Grenfell disaster? This study used network analysis to explore this question, specifically how responsibility “was negotiated, resisted, and redirected among a heterogeneous set of actors”. They used the below Grenfell web of blame from an inquiry submission (image not found in this paper): Extracts: ·      “Understanding blame… Continue reading The Anatomy of Blame: A Network Analysis of Strategic Responsibility-Shifting After a Systemic Disaster (Grenfell disaster)