Why safety performance indicators?

A response from Andrew Hale to Andrew Hopkins’ 2009 article about indicators (link in comments). [See tomorrow’s compendium dedicated to Hopkins & Hale] Extracts: ·     Hale starts with outlining why we need indicators, suggesting three obvious roles ·     Monitoring the level of safety in a system, which “answers the question: is the level of safety OK as… Continue reading Why safety performance indicators?

The safety measurement problem revisited

A response from Kjellén to Hopkins’ 2009 article about indicators (link in comments). [See week’s compendium dedicated to Hopkins & Hale] Extracts: ·        “LTI-rate gives the same weight to injuries with dramatically different consequences; that the measure is easily manipulated; and that natural statistical fluctuations make it useless for feedback control of other than the largest… Continue reading The safety measurement problem revisited

Leveson and Dekker on Reason: How the Critics Got the Swiss Cheese Model Wrong – Andrew Hopkins

Andrew Hopkins in this article defends Reason’s Swiss Cheese Metaphor (SCM) from critiques from both Nancy Leveson and Sid Dekker. Just a few extracts. [** Be on the lookout for next week’s compendium dedicated to Hopkins & Hale] I’m taking no sides – just reporting what’s in the paper: ·        He selects criticisms of Reason’s work… Continue reading Leveson and Dekker on Reason: How the Critics Got the Swiss Cheese Model Wrong – Andrew Hopkins

“Managing the risks of major accidents” – Andrew Hopkins, YouTube presentation

A 2024 YT video from Andrew Hopkins about managing the risks of major accidents. This comes in the lead up to next week’s compendium of research dedicated to Andrew Hale & Andrew Hopkins. Some extracts: ·        He refers to the Safety Paradox where managers “honestly believed that safety was their top priority that they never sacrificed… Continue reading “Managing the risks of major accidents” – Andrew Hopkins, YouTube presentation

Counteracting the Cultural Causes of Disaster

This 1999 article from Andrew Hopkins talks about the cultural factors that helped to incubate the 1994 Moura mine disaster in Australia. He starts by saying that Turner’s work demonstrated that “all socio-technical disasters involve an information or communication failure of some kind, in that they are preceded by a series of `discrepant events’ which… Continue reading Counteracting the Cultural Causes of Disaster

Studying organisational cultures and their effects on safety

Hopkins in this discussion paper explores organisational cultures, and how they effect safety. You’ll note he writes cultures, plural, rather than culture as a monolithic construct. Way too much to cover in this paper, so just a few points. Check out the full paper if the topic interests you. Hopkins starts with “Despite all that… Continue reading Studying organisational cultures and their effects on safety

Thinking About Process Safety Indicators

This well-cited paper from Hopkins (2007) discusses some of the inconsistencies that existed at the time (and likely does still) about process safety indicators, and the definitions and uses of other indicators like leading and lagging. This paper sparked a number of interested follow-up papers from other authors – I’ll cover some of these soon.… Continue reading Thinking About Process Safety Indicators

A culture of denial: Sociological similarities between the Moura and Gretley mine disasters

This 2000 paper from Hopkins compares the underlying sociological and organisation factors behind both the Moura and Gretley mine disasters. I’ve skipped a lot, so check out the full paper for the details. First he says that while every disaster has its own unique set of events, “It does not follow that every disaster requires… Continue reading A culture of denial: Sociological similarities between the Moura and Gretley mine disasters

Management walk-arounds: Lessons from the Gulf of Mexico oil well blowout

This 2011 paper from Andrew Hopkins discusses the function of management walkarounds, and their role in the genesis of major accidents, using the Macondo blowout accident. *** Note: This type of description is replete with counterfactuals and the clarity of hindsight, so keep that in mind. Overall, Hopkins argues that despite the best intentions of… Continue reading Management walk-arounds: Lessons from the Gulf of Mexico oil well blowout

What are we to make of safe behaviour programs?

This 2006 discussion paper from Andrew Hopkins critically discusses some assumptions underlying safe behaviour programs and some of their limitations in the context of complex systems. I can only cover some of the points, so recommend you read the full paper. Note: Trigger warning for those who violently object to ‘unsafe behaviour’. Overall, Hopkins argues:… Continue reading What are we to make of safe behaviour programs?