NASA’s language of risk was “technical, impersonal, and bureaucratic”. Some extracts from both the Columbia accident report (CAIB 2003 image 1) and Ocasio’s chapter ‘The Opacity of Risk’, in Organization at the Limit (images 2 & 3; awesome book – I think essential reading). I’m writing up both for upcoming summaries, but for now just… Continue reading NASA and the blinding language of catastrophic risk
Tag: caib
What System Safety Engineering Can Learn from the Columbia Accident (Nancy Leveson)
Leveson & Cutcher-Gershenfeld discuss systems safety in the context of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) investigation. NB. These types of analyses are, of course, replete with hindsight and outcome logics, and sometimes judgmental attributions (failure, inadequate). But that doesn’t inherently mean we can’t learn anything. Extracts: · “The CAIB report describes system safety engineering at… Continue reading What System Safety Engineering Can Learn from the Columbia Accident (Nancy Leveson)
Escaping Failures of Foresight
An interesting discussion paper from David Woods, in response to a paper from Andrew Hopkins discussing process safety indicators (see my article from a few weeks back). ** I haven’t done a good job of this – so suggest you read the original paper. You might want a strong coffee. Woods takes a bit of… Continue reading Escaping Failures of Foresight
SafetyInsights.org 