NASA’s language of risk was “technical, impersonal, and bureaucratic”. Some extracts from both the Columbia accident report (CAIB 2003 image 1) and Ocasio’s chapter ‘The Opacity of Risk’, in Organization at the Limit (images 2 & 3; awesome book – I think essential reading). I’m writing up both for upcoming summaries, but for now just… Continue reading NASA and the blinding language of catastrophic risk
Tag: nasa
Escaping Failures of Foresight
An interesting discussion paper from David Woods, in response to a paper from Andrew Hopkins discussing process safety indicators (see my article from a few weeks back). ** I haven’t done a good job of this – so suggest you read the original paper. You might want a strong coffee. Woods takes a bit of… Continue reading Escaping Failures of Foresight
Normal accident theory and learning from major accidents at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
This paper discussed four major NASA accidents in the context of Normal Accident Theory (NAT), high reliability and some other aspects of organisational theory. Then they discuss some ‘remedies’ to counter some of the organisational risk factors. I’ve skipped large amounts of this paper, so much that maybe even parts of this summary won’t make… Continue reading Normal accident theory and learning from major accidents at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
SafetyInsights.org 