SafetyInsights.org

This coroner’s report describes the workplace death of a worker who was struck by a reversing bucket truck.

They highlighted the problem with paper systems and generic inductions/training and instructions that don’t address the specific work-related hazards. (Or, at least, the investigations didn’t delve far enough into the specifics of training.)

They also highlight the problem of simply assuming something critical will be addressed, rather than purposefully developing an intervention and verification of that issue.

The coroner noted:

·      The bucket truck driver underwent an induction, including several WHS topics like hazard awareness, incident reporting and safe work procedures

·      While “the totality of the evidence suggests unsurprisingly that all employees received a form of induction”, the coroner would be remiss in accepting this at face value, so evaluated just *what* was communicated in the induction

·      Other witnesses were not present at the truck driver’s induction, but one witness remarked “he was unable to say how the company ensured [the truck driver] had been given appropriate instruction about how to use equipment at the depot” rather than “a general answer that people at the depot would have done it”

·      A business owner was “vague in his knowledge of some fairly significant matters such as the Plant Code of Practice

·      The driver’s signature was on an induction checklist. The ops manager informed that they could go through the checklist and tick it off, but he “seemed to suggest they would look at the Company manual and flick through the headings and they were given a copy to read later”

·      He also couldn’t recall what was said about safe work procedures, but said “employees could access it on the computer and print out pages if needed”

·      The manager “could not recall any discussions about [the driver] moving trucks but that was [the driver’s] job

·      He also “does not recall any discussions about the dangers of moving trucks or equipment in the yard” and “most of those experienced in the industry would know when they needed help or …a spotter”

·      It was “reasonable for [the company] to expect the [driver] to perform a simple task safely” such as looking around the area and truck before driving, and asking for a spotter (which the driver was verbally warned to use in a prior workplace incident)

·      Finally, while the induction process was likely completed by the driver, and checklists were ticked off, “there is really no evidence that these matters [specific hazards, safe work procedures, assessing and managing risks] were considered in the induction or any later training”

Shout me a coffee

Report link: https://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/632203/cif-poxon-sj-20160708.pdf

LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/benhutchinson2_this-coroners-report-describes-the-workplace-activity-7140093180007366656-uvUy?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

Source: Coroners Court of Queensland. Inquest into the death of Simon James Poxon. 2013/738