This 2004 paper covered a number of pit falls and misuses in risk assessment. I’ll break it into two posts. Pit falls: · Carrying out a risk assessment to support a decision that has already been made (image 2) · Using a generic assessment when a site-specific assessment is needed – here a range of different hazards… Continue reading Pitfalls in risk assessment – part 1
Hazard reporting: How can it improve safety?
This study, drawing on ethnographic data, examined whether hazard reporting acted as a type of extended incident report, allowing for more proactive action. I can’t do this justice, so recommend you read the paper. Note: I’ve skipped a lot of the paper. Data came from a broader 3-month ethnographic project at a water distributor-retailer in… Continue reading Hazard reporting: How can it improve safety?
The problems of double-checking and lack of operator independence in barrier management
Is double-checking effective? How independent can human actions be when part of a verification activity? Not much to say here – I found the following excerpts from the CIEHF’s white paper on “Human Factors in Barrier Management” interesting, discussing the potentially misaligned assumptions of independence in verifications. They cover the limitations of independence, how the… Continue reading The problems of double-checking and lack of operator independence in barrier management
Controls, barriers, safeguards – what’s the difference? Does it matter?
It seems there has been a hive of interest for barrier-based approaches, with the ICMM’s Critical Control Management being the most prominent in my neck of the woods. Given its apparent success in generating interest, I thought it worth sharing that barrier-based approaches have a long and sophisticated history in systems engineering and the process/oil… Continue reading Controls, barriers, safeguards – what’s the difference? Does it matter?
Organisational factors found to be strongest influencers of worker behaviour in mining accidents
What is the influence of organizational factors on worker behaviour and subsequent accidents? Quite a lot, according to this upcoming summary. This study evaluated 305 Iranian mining accidents via HFACS, exploring the relationship between organisational factors, supervision, preconditions for acts and worker acts via structural equation modelling. If you look past the rather normative frame… Continue reading Organisational factors found to be strongest influencers of worker behaviour in mining accidents
Are hazard reporting systems a “poor starting point for learning”?
How well does hazard reporting fulfil its purported goals in practice? I finally got around to summarising this interesting study from Jop Havinga, Kym Bancroft and Drew Rae which explored this question. Namely, using ethnographic data they studied how aligned hazard reporting is to: 1) sharing experiences, 2) organizational learning, 3) extending organizational memory, 4)… Continue reading Are hazard reporting systems a “poor starting point for learning”?
Moderation in all things, except when it comes to workplace safety: Accidents are most likely to occur under moderately hazardous work conditions
This was pretty interesting. It studied how people adapt their protective behaviour in response to differing perceived hazardousness levels (“safety behaviour). Four protocols were used. Studies 1 & 2 used archival data (including actual accident investigations), and 3 & 4 were experiments using both students and then an online sample of workers; so note the… Continue reading Moderation in all things, except when it comes to workplace safety: Accidents are most likely to occur under moderately hazardous work conditions
Modeling patterns of breakdown (or archetypes) of human and organizational processes in accidents using system dynamics
Tom McDaniel‘s post yesterday about safety narratives reminded me a little of safety archetypes. Safety archetypes are models, patterns or universally recognisable ideas that can be found in organisations. They can be applied to normal or successful work, or for failures. Not surprisingly, the latter has been studied a lot. This study explored system archetypes… Continue reading Modeling patterns of breakdown (or archetypes) of human and organizational processes in accidents using system dynamics
When a checklist is not enough: How to improve them andwhat else is needed
What is the role of checklists and time-outs in preventing adverse events? What additional measures are needed to reduce these events? This brief study, including Sid Dekker and Nancy Leveson, explored these questions in the context of healthcare. I think the general questions and thinking is applicable elsewhere from a systems perspective. Not a summary… Continue reading When a checklist is not enough: How to improve them andwhat else is needed
Blaming Deadmen: Causes, Culprits, and Chaos in Accounting for Technological Accidents
This was a fascinating read, exploring objectivist and constructivist explanations and reflections around the public inquiry into the Waterfall train accident; and namely how a myopic objectivist focus on rational decision-making and technology may lead to blame and a weak understanding of sociotechnical & social systems. The findings are framed within John Downer’s concept of… Continue reading Blaming Deadmen: Causes, Culprits, and Chaos in Accounting for Technological Accidents
SafetyInsights.org 