SafetyInsights.org

This explored whether safety climate (SC) survey data can be used as a leading/lagging indicator in relation to hydrocarbon (HC) leaks in the oil & gas industry. Survey data (n = 2188) was from offshore employees in an oil & gas company. Two research hypotheses were posed: 1) SC indicator scores will be negatively correlated… Continue reading Safety climate and hydrocarbon leaks – An empirical contribution to the leading-lagging indicator discussion

This explored how the contagion of emotions triggers moral disengagement and its impact on work-related injuries. Contagion is said to be “the implicit process through which individuals are involuntarily and automatically “infected” by emotion of others that virally spreads in large social communities” (p2). Specifically, they look at how the contagion of both positive and… Continue reading Emotional contagion as a trigger for moral disengagement: Their effects on workplace injuries

Abstract Wildland fire management agencies manage wildland fires for resource benefit while protecting firefighter and public safety. Firefighting fatalities and property damaged by wildfires prompt reviews aimed at preventing similar accidents. The principles of high-reliability organizing (HRO) have been used to analyze such unexpected, high-consequence events. However, fire managers who agree to the value of… Continue reading Voices from the Field: Wildland Fire Managers and High-Reliability Organizing Mindfulness

This was really interesting. Via document analysis, it explored the origin of the figure that 80% of maritime accidents were due to or largely involved “human contribution” or “errors”. They note that few sources provide any actual evidence supporting this assertion. 292 documents were reviewed. Note that this paper was interested in exploring the origin… Continue reading Searching for the origins of the myth: 80% human error impact on maritime safety

This discussed some of the limitations or considerations in using risk matrices. Given the paper draws on worked examples and figures, I can only give a basic description of a few points and suggest you read the source (which explains the discontinuity between paragraphs in my summary, since I’ve jumped over a lot of supporting… Continue reading Risk matrices: Implied accuracy and false assumptions

Abstract Objective: This opportunistic natural study investigated the effects of relocation of office workers from a 30-year-old building to a new purpose-built building. The new building included an attractive central staircase that was easily accessed and negotiated, as well as breakout spaces and a centralised facilities area. The researchers aimed to determine the impact of… Continue reading Workplace building design and office-based workers’ activity: a study of a natural experiment

This brief paper talks about some challenges with RCA methods. For an article in “the problem with” series, this one is pretty mild and somewhat favourable towards RCA. Since RCA refers to a range of approaches and tools, this looks at more general issues and no particular tool. The authors note upfront that RCA does… Continue reading The problem with root cause analysis

This study looked at the relationships between safety climate, injuries, and setting SMART goals (including goals related to zero injuries). 564 surveys from across 26 high voltage electrical contractors were analysed. Results: 1. Safety climate wasn’t found to be correlated to self-reports of injury, nor to lost-time or no-lost time injury statistics. 2. Safety climate… Continue reading Why Improving the Safety Climate Doesn’t Always Improve the Safety Performance

Abstract Risk matrices are used in process safety to rate and rank risks of hazardous events to help with decision making on risk reduction for processes. For example, commonly they are used in process hazard analysis to rate the risks of hazard scenarios. Flaws in their theoretical framework and mathematical inconsistencies in their use have… Continue reading Designing risk matrices to avoid risk ranking reversal errors

This studied the relationship between unexpected events and project performance in 21 projects (which were evaluated 3-12 years after project completion). It’s argued that traditional project management theory often highlights inaccurate foresight, optimism biases and poor planning as key causal factors in unexpected events throughout the project lifecycle. Instead, these authors sought to explore how… Continue reading Wrong, but not failed – A study of unexpected events and project performance in 21 engineering projects