Residual risk and the psychology of lower order controls

This conference paper briefly discussed the follies of lower order controls in the context of human performance. Nicely, it took a really empathetic view of people and their limits in perception and attention: it’s not a bug that needs to be blamed or feared, but just a biological feature which needs to be considered. First… Continue reading Residual risk and the psychology of lower order controls

Compendium: SIFs, Major Hazards, Fatal & Traumatic hazards, risks

This is an expansion to my prior compendium on Critical Controls, Barriers and Energy thinking. Suggest you read that in conjunction to this, link here: Barriers, Critical Controls, Verifications, Energy Models  If you’re after indicators check this mini-compendium out: Safety & Risk Performance indicators (lead, lag, drive, process safety + more) This compendium focuses on articles… Continue reading Compendium: SIFs, Major Hazards, Fatal & Traumatic hazards, risks

Are workplace psychosocial factors associated with work-related injury in the US workforce?

Another study on the links between work-related psychosocial factors and work injury. Data was based on the 2010 National Health Survey in the US, including >16k workers. Survey data, so consider limitations. Key findings: ·        In multivariate models, “job insecurity, work–family imbalance, and hostile work environment were each positively associated with WRI prevalence (odds ratio [OR]:… Continue reading Are workplace psychosocial factors associated with work-related injury in the US workforce?

Visualizing what’s missing: Using deep learning and Bow-Tie diagrams to identify and visualize missing leading indicators in industrial construction

This study, among a few other things, compared 633 incidents against >9 inspection reports with similar contexts to understand the overlap. Data was from a Canadian construction project over 3 years. E.g. They used multi-methods, including natural language processing, text mining, bow ties and more to evaluate if field inspections are looking at the same… Continue reading Visualizing what’s missing: Using deep learning and Bow-Tie diagrams to identify and visualize missing leading indicators in industrial construction

Control charts for accident frequency: a motivation for real-time occupational safety monitoring

This paper compares real-time or active monitoring of safety incidents via cumulative sum (CUSUM) control charts. It’s an interesting read, and if you’re not savvy with control charts or statistics then just skip over the technical stuff. Some of the findings are still pretty relevant. In saying that, I’ve skipped most of the dense statistical… Continue reading Control charts for accident frequency: a motivation for real-time occupational safety monitoring

Compendium of Nancy Leveson: STAMP, STPA, CAST and Systems Thinking

Although I don’t often mention or post about Leveson’s work, she’s probably been the most influential thinker on my approach after Barry Turner. So here is a mini-compendium covering some of Leveson’s work. Feel free to shout a coffee if you’d like to support the growth of my site: https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/2908/Engineering-a-Safer-WorldSystems-Thinking-Applied https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840608101478 https://doi.org/10.1145/7474.7528 http://therm.ward.bay.wiki.org/assets/pages/documents-archived/safety-3.pdf http://sunnyday.mit.edu/papers/Rasmussen-Legacy.pdf https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00140139.2015.1015623… Continue reading Compendium of Nancy Leveson: STAMP, STPA, CAST and Systems Thinking

Failing to learn and learning to fail (intelligently): How great organizations put failure to work to innovate and improve

An interesting paper from Mark Cannon & Amy Edmondson about failing intelligently. Opening the paper they argue that while the idea of organisations learning from their failures is obvious – “yet organizations that systematically learn from failure are rare”. They’ve also found that few organisations effectively experiment to learn, which requires by necessity generating failures… Continue reading Failing to learn and learning to fail (intelligently): How great organizations put failure to work to innovate and improve

“there is no such thing as a root cause [and therefore] there is technically no such thing as the beginning of a mishap” — Dekker

Extracts from Dekker’s work about the ontological and empirical shakiness of ‘root causes’. I’ve taken material from two versions of The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error (Investigations). In Dekker’s view: ·        “There is no ‘root’ cause” (or ‘root causes’) ·        Given the multiple angles and interactions in complex systems, you “can really construct “causes” from everywhere”… Continue reading “there is no such thing as a root cause [and therefore] there is technically no such thing as the beginning of a mishap” — Dekker

Workplace Psychosocial Factors and Their Association With Musculoskeletal Disorders

More data on the links between workplace psychosocial factors and injury – this time specifically on musculoskeletal disorders (MSD). 47 studies met inclusion. Findings: ·        The most common MSDs investigated were lower back pain, neck and shoulder pain, and upper extremity symptoms and disorders ·        Workplace psychosocial factors that were statistically significant were support, collaboration, job control,… Continue reading Workplace Psychosocial Factors and Their Association With Musculoskeletal Disorders

Failing audits and ‘comprehensively shallow’ evaluations of system performance

Do (some) audits focus too greatly on paperwork? Or is the paperwork focus a strength of audits? In our previous paper, we reviewed 44 major accident reports to assess the accident inquiries’ descriptions of pre-accident audit performance. We argued that: “many audits exhibited a ‘comprehensive shallowness,’ delving excessively into minor system details and paperwork rather… Continue reading Failing audits and ‘comprehensively shallow’ evaluations of system performance