Can adherence to process mask weak signals of risk?
A cool read examining how ‘soft’ info influences safety in rationalistic firms (a prison in this case) that prioritise ‘hard’ info.
Shared under an open access licence.
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Extracts:
· “Soft information is informal, tacit and often qualitative”, but also the kind that gives early warning before harm materialises
· It notes a tension between “anticipation and verification” where the authors find that “verification tends to dominate”
· It identifies three coexisting logics shaping response: precaution, laissez-faire and legality, each shaping what counts as credible info and legitimate action
· Under the precautionary logic: frontline staff respond early, e.g. “A red alarm turns on in my head”; an example of responding to weak signals
· Under the laissez-faire logic, having restraint is normalised, e.g. “The prisoners run a tight internal code in here, and we count on it”; indicating a calm surface order can mask the turmoil underneath
· Under a legal logic, “concerns must be documented and legally sound”, e.g. suggesting soft info often loses its influence unless translated into formal written evidence
· And really interestingly: “information must typically conform to the format of an incident report to be considered valid by decision-makers”
· Authors introduce the idea of “response-activating texts” which are written documents that trigger formal organisational action
· The issue is that “incidents often need to materialise before formal action is taken” and hence “most hard information is fundamentally historical and, therefore, arrives too late”
· A quote from the frontline captures this nicely “How much shit actually has to hit the fan before you do something?”
· Per a senior officer: “What is wrong must be documented. I cannot move prisoners from the wing based on speculation. Unfortunately, incidents often occur in those situations”
· In all, when legality/bureaucracy dominates sensemaking “if nothing is illegal, little is expected to be done”
· These logics may protect process, but weaken proactive prevention efforts
· “if a legal logic—which is, by definition, reactive— forms and dominates how an organisation responds to safety‐ related information, it can negatively impact safety within the organisation”