Human Factors and Ergonomics in Industry 5.0 —A Systematic Literature Review

This open access article may interest people – it explored the future of human factors/ergonomics in Industry 5.0 (I05). Not a summary but you can read the full paper freely. Some extracts: Shout me a coffee Study link: https://doi.org/10.3390/app15042123 LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/benhutchinson2_this-open-access-article-may-interest-people-activity-7300617102564933632-WGPj?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAeWwekBvsvDLB8o-zfeeLOQ66VbGXbOpJU

Human factor analysis of cockpit work incidents in high-speed workboats: the mystery hidden between the lines

This study unpacked what investigators look at and how they construct causes in high-speed workboats. It employed a Safety-II / HOP / HF perspective. Tl;dr: human factors are poorly evaluated and largely seen as individual-level factors. Some extracts: ·        “Although the analysis focused on negative observations, it also identified HFs that supported the activity” ·        “Many pivotal… Continue reading Human factor analysis of cockpit work incidents in high-speed workboats: the mystery hidden between the lines

Efficacy and Understanding of the Safety Hierarchy of Controls

This PhD thesis from Stephen Young was interesting. They studied evidence supporting the hierarchy of control (HOC), constraints on its efficacy, and more. Way too much to cover. Some extracts: ·        There isn’t a lot of evidence supporting the efficacy of the HOC ·        One reason is: “An unequivocal demonstration of efficacy [of the HOC] is problematic,… Continue reading Efficacy and Understanding of the Safety Hierarchy of Controls

An ode to Drs Richard Cook, Jens Rasmussen & Bob Wears: A mini-compendium of their legacies

This is long overdue – but I wanted to cover some of the work from these giants who have played a significant part in modern safety thinking. Focus is on articles I’ve written about or used extracts from, or could find a full-text link for, and higher-cited articles. It’s not systematic – and unfortunately a… Continue reading An ode to Drs Richard Cook, Jens Rasmussen & Bob Wears: A mini-compendium of their legacies

Safety metrics and reports “make no contribution to proving the effectiveness of our crucial systems” – Paper Safe, Greg Smith

A few apt extracts from Greg Smith’s excellent ‘Paper Safe’. If you’ve not yet read this or Proving Safety, then do yourself the favour. Greg argues: ·        Many indicators in use are measures of activity and usually tell us something has been done ·        But, “They tell us nothing about the quality or effectiveness of the activity”… Continue reading Safety metrics and reports “make no contribution to proving the effectiveness of our crucial systems” – Paper Safe, Greg Smith

Can serious industrial accidents be eliminated? Article from 1917 equally valid today

Can serious industrial accidents be eliminated? Oof, this was a banger read – from 1917. Talks about: ·        Focusing on effective workplace design and engineering – not just machine guarding ·        Not focusing on “careless” workers and such stuff ·        Focusing on the severity of incidents and not just their frequency ·        The primary duty of the employer should… Continue reading Can serious industrial accidents be eliminated? Article from 1917 equally valid today

Humans are fallible and we should design out harm: 1913 rail safety article

“What a time to be alive!” – People in 1913, probably. This interesting article from 1913 about rail safety comes to some interesting proposals: human fallibility is a normal and expected thing, that we should seek design and systems solutions where possible, and companies always prioritise profit over ‘safety’ trade-offs: ·        “In the past, when an accident… Continue reading Humans are fallible and we should design out harm: 1913 rail safety article

Allocation of Blame After a Safety Incident

This single page conference paper discussed an experiment on how blame is allocated following incidents. The scenario was a “realistic, but fictitious” incident involving a worker (both experienced or not experienced, depending on the scenario), whom is killed when touching an energised bus bar while feeding electrical wire into a pedestal. They systematically manipulated the… Continue reading Allocation of Blame After a Safety Incident

Compendium: Blame, Just Culture & language

Here’s another compendium of articles exploring blame and language in the construction of post-hoc causality explanations, or how blame effects learning and investigations. The other part covers some articles around Just Culture and restorative culture. Note: I’ve mostly focused on articles that I’ve either already summarised or that I could find a full text link… Continue reading Compendium: Blame, Just Culture & language

Human Performance Tools: Engaging Workers as the Best Defense Against Errors & Error Precursors

This article covered a more progressive view on human performance, with suggestions on some tools. Too much to cover, so just a few points. They start by saying to consider three truisms: “To err is human. Workers are fallible. Errors are inevitable (as well as predictable)”. These are fundamentals to understanding the human performance approach… Continue reading Human Performance Tools: Engaging Workers as the Best Defense Against Errors & Error Precursors