Can adding more controls / barriers create new failure modes? …maybe. Adding new controls doesn’t leave the surrounding work unchanged. A control may prevent one event while obstructing another function, shifting risk elsewhere, or introducing byproducts that weren’t initially anticipated. E.g. a barricade protecting plant / pedestrian collisions may also obstruct visibility, or an alarm… Continue reading Can adding more controls / barriers create new failure modes?
Tag: ccm
Part 3 – Critical Control / Barriers: Human Factors & realistic human performance expectations
Ogres have layers, and so do barriers. Human performance isn’t separate from the barrier system, rather in socio-technical environments, human action is often a key mechanism through which a barrier functions. In part 3 of the Critical Control / Barrier series, we unpack how to properly specify human performance as a credible control without straying… Continue reading Part 3 – Critical Control / Barriers: Human Factors & realistic human performance expectations
Enhancing critical control management using bowties for high consequence risks at Rio Tinto
This paper explores Rio Tinto’s evolving approach and adaptation of their Critical Control Framework. They integrated the most useful parts from ICMM, Energy Institute, & CCPS. The paper was motivated by an ‘uplift program’ at Rio, involving a complete review and alignment of their approach to controls and critical control management, including definitions and improved… Continue reading Enhancing critical control management using bowties for high consequence risks at Rio Tinto
Methane events not HPIs and ventilation systems not seen as critical controls – Grosvenor Board of Inquiry
Started reading the Anglo American Grosvenor board of inquiry on the weekend. Will post some extracts over time: · Within Glencore at the time, the seriousness of the potential outcome drove which investigation and reporting level was used · A 5 point potential consequence rating, ranging from 1 (negligible) to 5 (catastrophic) was used · The inquiry notes,… Continue reading Methane events not HPIs and ventilation systems not seen as critical controls – Grosvenor Board of Inquiry
Building Resilience into Safety Management Systems: Precursors and Controls to Reduce Serious Injuries and Fatalities (SIFs)
Another on SIF prevention. This (interim) report (another from the recent compendium – see comments for link) covers the findings from a few activities, including two SIF workshops about ID, implementing and monitoring critical controls for SIF hazards, and the role of human and org factors. Too much to cover, so a few extracts: · “the… Continue reading Building Resilience into Safety Management Systems: Precursors and Controls to Reduce Serious Injuries and Fatalities (SIFs)
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