‘All useful systems are sociotechnical’ Part 2 extracts from Leveson’s ‘An introduction to Systems Engineering’. This is from a systems engineering & cybernetics perspective. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson · Leveson argues that “All useful systems are sociotechnical”, and per the Ralph Miles Jr… Continue reading ‘All useful systems are sociotechnical’ – Part 2 extracts from Leveson’s book
What happens when operators misunderstand the design and designers misunderstand the operators?
What happens when operators misunderstand the design and designers misunderstand the operators? Couple of partial extracts from Busby & Hibberd’s 2002 article which explored accident report sources to construct mismatches between operator and designer assumptions. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson Extracts: · Designers may… Continue reading What happens when operators misunderstand the design and designers misunderstand the operators?
Rework as a systemic risk amplifier: Exposure-normalized modeling of safety frequency and severity
Does construction rework act as a safety risk amplifier? This study from Peter E.D Love analysed data from 599 projects. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson Extracts:· “Rework is not only a response to quality deviations but also an activity that alters task organisation and… Continue reading Rework as a systemic risk amplifier: Exposure-normalized modeling of safety frequency and severity
Dr Marcin Nazaruk Part 1: HOP, New View, Learning from Daily Work
Today I chat with Dr Marcin Nazaruk, who shares his practical experience and research on learning from daily work and application on Safety-II and HOP principles to improve learning and risk management. The discussion also explores themes around risk controls, work constraints, risk assessments, and error traps. Check out Part 1 and please help like… Continue reading Dr Marcin Nazaruk Part 1: HOP, New View, Learning from Daily Work
Blame has more layers, like Ogres, compared to praise: ‘asymmetric morality’
Ogres have layers. And apparently so too blame more than praise! This explored whether we judge negative behaviour differently from positive behaviour via blame & praise. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson Tl;dr: blame and praise aren’t opposite versions of the same moral judgement.… Continue reading Blame has more layers, like Ogres, compared to praise: ‘asymmetric morality’
Does adding more checks make work ‘safer’? Critical Controls part 2
Does adding more checks and more people make work ‘safer’? I think it’s an easy assumption to make, but in Part 2 of my Critical Control / Barrier / Safeguard series, we explore why this may not be an ideal assumption. Two related ideas are: 1. The fallacy of independence: Several controls can share the… Continue reading Does adding more checks make work ‘safer’? Critical Controls part 2
Haddon 1974: Why do we blame people instead of fixing a poorly designed system?
Why do we blame people for failing to compensate for a poorly designed system? A cool extract from Baker & Haddon’s 1974 article about people and poor design (in my view, Haddon is among the GOATs). They argue that ‘traditionally’ (lolz those silly dark age people of yesteryear, not like us modern elites who stopped… Continue reading Haddon 1974: Why do we blame people instead of fixing a poorly designed system?
The unspoken theory: How ‘socio-technical systems’ are used without being theorized in safety research
What do you mean by a sociotechnical system? This article explores how sociotechnical system (STS) thinking is interpreted in safety research. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson Extracts: · Safety is “not the outcome of isolated human or technical failures, but an emergent property of… Continue reading The unspoken theory: How ‘socio-technical systems’ are used without being theorized in safety research
“Warning signs rarely arrive pre-packaged” – to be warnings “managers must have an idea of what exactly it might be a warning of—otherwise, it is merely more information”
When are warning signs seen as signs, or just noise? I love this quote (and article) from Carl Macrae discussing how warning signs are so readily constructed in hindsight, but difficult for organisations to construct at the time. I’ve referenced it a few times. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier… Continue reading “Warning signs rarely arrive pre-packaged” – to be warnings “managers must have an idea of what exactly it might be a warning of—otherwise, it is merely more information”
Rethinking learning from incidents in healthcare: a Safety-II model integrating work-as-imagined, work-as-done, and work-as-experienced
Can Safety-II principles expand learning within investigations? This article proposes a Safety-II framed incident review model for healthcare capturing WAI (work-as-imagined), WAD (work-as-done) and WAE (work-as-experienced). Shared under an open access licence. PS. Check out my YouTube and recent Critical Control / barrier vid: https://youtube.com/@safe_as_pod?si=iUaDPJynPemQRZhY Shout a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson Extracts: · “A foundational question remains unresolved:… Continue reading Rethinking learning from incidents in healthcare: a Safety-II model integrating work-as-imagined, work-as-done, and work-as-experienced
